By the end of May 1944, the airborne part of the Normandy invasion had already been argued over once.
Two American airborne divisions, the 82d and the 101st, were to drop behind Utah Beach on the night before the landings. Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, who commanded the Allied Expeditionary Air Force, thought the plan far too risky. In late April he objected so strongly, according to the U.S. Army’s official history, that the plans were substantially revised. He insisted that most of the glider landings be moved to dusk on D-Day, when he expected fewer losses. “His objections were sustained and the changes made.”
Then, late in May, Allied intelligence reported that the Germans had moved their 91st Division into the Cotentin Peninsula, where the paratroopers were to land. The risks, in the official history’s words, soared. Leigh-Mallory grew more pessimistic about what he called “this very speculative operation.”
On May 29, by the official history’s account, he told General Dwight Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, that casualties were likely to run over 50 percent, and that the results would be too small to count on for the Utah Beach assault. In his memoir, Eisenhower remembered Leigh-Mallory protesting once more against what he called the “futile slaughter” of two fine divisions, and estimating that the gliders might lose some seventy percent of their strength.
Eisenhower wrote that Leigh-Mallory was “earnestly sincere,” and was “merely giving me, as was his duty, his frank convictions.” He told him to put the recommendation in a letter, which, Eisenhower said, would protect the air commander if his advice was disregarded. Then he went to his tent alone. If he canceled the drop, he reasoned, he would have to cancel the Utah landing too, or send it in with even worse odds.
He replied that he agreed the risks were great, but that the airborne landings were essential to the whole operation. If the invasion went in, the official history records his answer, the airborne risks must be accepted.
At the final weather conference, at 4:30 in the morning of June 5, the forecast was still below the planned minimum from the air point of view. Leigh-Mallory later wrote in his official report that he gave his opinion that the air forces could provide a reasonable measure of protection “and that airborne operations would be practicable.” The paratroopers went in shortly after midnight. The aircraft that carried the Americans belonged to the IXth Troop Carrier Command, part of the force he commanded.
Not everything went to plan. Some planes were scattered by clouds and flak; one battalion of the 101st, dropped mostly outside its zone, spent most of D-Day assembling. In his report, Leigh-Mallory wrote that the airborne air operations had been carried out “successfully, and with a remarkably low casualty rate,” counting losses as a share of the sorties flown.
Eisenhower added one more detail in his memoir. When the attack succeeded, Leigh-Mallory was the first to call him, to share his delight and to say he regretted having added to Eisenhower’s burdens in the last tense days before D-Day.