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Psychological Safety

No reported mistakes doesn't mean no mistakes.

◷ 4 min read▤ 13 true storiesWorks with AI, with changesSee its neighbors on the map →

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Amy Edmondson thought she knew what she would find. Better teams make fewer mistakes. It is the kind of finding nobody argues with, and a hospital seemed like the perfect place to prove it, because there mistakes are counted.

For six months, trained investigators tracked medication errors on eight nursing units in two teaching hospitals. Separately, Edmondson surveyed the staff about how well each unit was led and how well people worked together. Then she put the two sets of numbers side by side.

The result was statistically significant. As she later put it, “the sign was in the wrong direction.” The units with the best leadership and the best teamwork had the highest error rates. Some units reported about ten times as many errors as others.

“I sat there, I think I froze,” she recalled.

Her first thought was that she had made a mistake herself.

Scrubs and a business suit

Then came a second thought. Maybe better teams don’t make more mistakes. Maybe they’re more willing to report them.

She sent another researcher onto the wards and told him nothing about the error data or the surveys. He came back saying the units were “very different places to work,” and his ranking of how open each unit was matched the error ranking almost exactly.

On the most open unit, the nurse manager worked in scrubs, and a nurse had felt free to phone a doctor at home because a dose looked too high. On the most closed unit, the manager wore a suit and talked behind a closed door, and a nurse who had hurt a patient drawing blood expected trouble for admitting it.

One survey question cut to the heart of it: is a mistake held against you on this unit? Where the answer was yes, fewer mistakes made it into the records. That says little about how many were made.

No reported mistakes doesn’t mean no mistakes.

Which should make any manager with a spotless record a little nervous.

The quiet that looks like success

A team where people don’t speak up rarely looks broken. It looks calm.

Picture a weekly project meeting. Every workstream reports green. One engineer has known for days that a supplier will deliver two weeks late, and she is waiting to see whether anyone else brings it up first. Nobody does. The meeting ends early, with no questions. The status stays green for one more week, and then the whole project turns red at once.

Every time someone thinks about speaking up, they make a quick, private calculation. The cost is immediate and personal: I’ll look careless, I’ll get blamed. The benefit comes later and is shared: the patient gets the right dose. Set up like that, silence is the easy choice. People tend to stay quiet unless someone takes the cost away.

Silence is like a smoke alarm someone unplugged because it kept going off over the toast. The house gets quieter. It doesn’t get safer.

In 1999 Edmondson gave the idea a name and a definition: psychological safety, “a shared belief held by members of a team that the team is safe for interpersonal risk taking.” In a study of 51 teams at a manufacturing company, the teams that felt safer did more of what the study counted as learning, and that learning was what linked safety to better performance.

This is not a case for going soft. In the hospital data, the units where people spoke up also scored highest on how clearly their managers set direction and how much they coached. Safety and high standards turned up together.

People judge the price of speaking up by what happened the last time someone did. The first person who brings you a mistake is watching your face, and so is everyone they tell afterward. You can ask your own team the hospital’s question, anonymously if you need to: is a mistake held against you here? If the answer is yes, your error count may not be the number you think it is.

Edmondson was studying nurses, and the risk they weighed was social: a raised eyebrow, a reprimand. Machines don’t weigh that kind of risk. Yet the way they are graded decides, in a similar way, which problems ever come to light.

Zero points for “I don’t know”

In 2025, researchers at OpenAI and Georgia Tech looked at why language models make things up.

Most popular tests score a model 1 point for a right answer and 0 for a wrong one. “I don’t know” also gets 0. Under those rules a guess never scores worse than an honest blank, and often scores better, so, the authors argue, models built to do well on those tests learn to guess.

One example from the paper: the researchers asked a leading open model for one author’s birthday and told it to answer only if it knew. Across three tries it gave three different dates. All were wrong.

The researchers’ proposed fix is a change to the scoring: make a confident wrong answer cost more than “I don’t know.” That is a change to how models are trained and ranked, not something a single prompt can undo. What you can do in your own work echoes Edmondson’s most open units: make “I’m not sure” a cheap thing to say, and then check the answers you get against the real thing.

A ward’s error count measured two things at once: how many mistakes were made, and how safe it felt to report them. A model’s confidence carries a similar double meaning. How sure it sounds tells you something about what it knows, and something about how it was graded.

Stories behind it

Amy Edmondson, eight hospital nursing units · published 1996The Sign Was in the Wrong DirectionWhere a mistake was held against you, fewer mistakes made it into the records. That says little about how many happened.Read the story →L. David Marquet, USS Santa Fe (US Navy) · 1999–2001Because You Told Me ToThe officer knew the order was impossible and passed it on anyway. In a top-down culture, his job was to pass orders on.Read the story →JR West (West Japan Railway) · 2005Call It Eight MetersThe conductor reported an overrun of 8 meters instead of the 30 or 40 they believed, having heard that short overruns drew lighter punishment. The control center took the number at face value.Read the story →Asiana Airlines Flight 214 · 2013Four Letters on the ScreenThe cockpit recording shows no sign the trainee told his instructor he was stressed about the approach, and later said he had feared that four red lights would mean failing the flight. The NTSB said his deference to the senior pilot likely played some role in the late go-around.Read the story →Ethan Bernstein, a mobile-device factory in southern China · 2008–2012Fix First, Explain LaterNew hires were told to stop using the line's shortcuts when managers came by, "because they'll get mad." The improvements went on, out of sight.Read the story →Cardiac surgery teams at 16 hospitals (Edmondson, Bohmer and Pisano study) · late 1990sA Transfer of PainThe training told every team member to speak up, but it often didn't happen; one person was even upbraided for pointing out what he believed was a life-threatening situation. Teams where people felt safe to speak up learned the procedure faster.Read the story →Poul-Henning Kamp, FreeBSD · 1999Any Colour Will DoKamp's sharpest worry was not the lost time. It was the newer contributors who watched the pile-on and decided not to propose anything at all.Read the story →Google · 2012–2016The Who Didn't Seem to MatterOf the five team dynamics Google's researchers found, they ranked psychological safety first. Their own survey item for it read, "If I make a mistake on our team, it is not held against me."Read the story →Korean Air Flight 801 · 1997–2002Not in Sight?The first officer and flight engineer asked questions but did not challenge the captain's early descents. The NTSB could not tell whether they missed the errors or were unwilling to confront him.Read the story →Peter Pronovost and Michigan's intensive care units · 2001–2006Five Steps Everyone KnewNurses had always nudged doctors, but many weren't sure it was their place. A written rule with management behind it settled the question.Read the story →Nokia · 2005–2013Move the Data Points to the RightMiddle managers who feared demotion or being shouted at stayed quiet or sent up optimistic reports. One declined to challenge a top manager's decision, saying he had a family and small children.Read the story →Julia Rozovsky, Yale School of Management · from 2009 (business school at Yale)Same Kind of PeopleIn her study group she "always felt like I had to be careful not to make mistakes around them." On her case team, "we all felt like we could say anything to each other."Read the story →United Airlines Flight 173 · 1978The Light That Stayed DarkThe flight engineer and first officer both knew the fuel was low. They mentioned it. Before the engines began to flame out, neither said "we have to land now."Read the story →

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Sources

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